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Abstract
Type-based protection mechanisms in a JVM-like environment must be administrated by the code consumer at the bytecode
level. Unfortunately, formulating a sound static type system for the full JVM bytecode language can be a daunting task. It is
therefore counter-productive for the designer of a bytecode-level type system to address the full complexity of the VM environment
in the early stage of design.
In this work, a lightweight modelling tool, Featherweight JVM, is proposed to facilitate the early evaluation of bytecode-level,
type-based protection mechanisms and, specifically, their ability to enforce security-motivated stack invariants and confinement
properties. Rather than modelling the execution of a specific bytecode stream, Featherweight JVM is a nondeterministic event
model that captures all the possible access event sequences that may be generated by a JVM-like environment when well-typed
bytecode programs are executed. The effect of deploying a type-based protection mechanism can be modelled by a safety policy
that constrains the event sequences produced by the VMmodel. To evaluate the effectiveness of the protection mechanism, security
theorems in the form of state invariants can then be proved in the policy-guarded VM model.
To demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach, Vitek et al.’s Confined Types has been formulated as a safety policy for
the Featherweight JVM, and a corresponding confinement theorem has been established. To reduce class loading overhead, a
capability-based reformulation of Confined Types is then studied, and is shown to preserve the confinement theorem. This paper
thus provides first evidence on the utility of Featherweight JVM in providing early feedback to the designer of type-based protection
mechanisms for JVM-like environments.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Static type systems have been proposed in recent years for the Java programming language [19] or its derivatives
[11] in order to enforce access control and confinement properties [44,20,47,48,1–3,16,23,9,38,46,41,15]. These
type systems are usually designed for the source language, and intended to be enforced by the code producer at
compile time. In many cases, the soundness of the type analyses is evaluated in a high-level core calculus, such as
Featherweight Java (FJ) [24], that captures the essence of the source language. An objection to this approach is that,
in a Java-like platform, in which code units are shipped and dynamically loaded as bytecode, program verification
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that is performed against source code, or administrated only by the code producer, cannot be trusted. This is the
standard security posture of language-based security works such as Proof-Carrying Code [35] and Typed Assembly
Language [34]: the object code to be executed by the code consumer may be produced by a malicious code producer,
generated by an untrusted compiler, or tampered with during transport. In order for the code consumer to enforce a
given typing discipline, the latter must be preserved at the level of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) bytecode language
[29]. Unfortunately, because of the lack of structured control flow, especially in the presence of subroutines that do not
conform to the last-in-first-out discipline, and also because of the complexity of data flow between the local variable
array and the operand stack, formulating sound static analysis at the bytecode level is a daunting task [39]. Formal
verification, however, has proved to be necessary when one works at the bytecode level, as security holes in early
implementation of the JVM bytecode verifier were uncovered by formalizing type systems for nontrivial fragments
of the JVM bytecode language [17]. Still, it is counter-productive for the designer of a bytecode-level type system to
address the full complexity of the JVM execution environment in the early stage of design.
In this work, a lightweight modelling tool, Featherweight JVM (FJVM), is proposed for evaluating bytecode-level,
type-based protection mechanisms in an early design stage. In particular, the goal is to determine if a type-based
protection mechanism enforces some given safety properties. The intended application is type-based access control.
To this end, this work considers two families of safety properties that have proved in the past to be particularly relevant
to access control.
1. Reachability and confinement properties: These include topological properties such as “may reach” (reachability)
or “must not reach” (confinement) over the underlying object graph of the heap1 (e.g. [48,15]).
2. Stack invariants: These include properties satisfied by individual activation records of the run-time stack, as well
as the relations between activation records within the same call chain (e.g. [16,38]).
Designed to support reasoning about the two families of safety properties stated above, FJVM is a nondeterministic
transition system that tracks access events generated by a JVM-like environment, and simulates their effects on the
global VM state. Only the aspects of a JVM state that are relevant to the study of reachability, confinement and stack
invariants are captured in FJVM. Other irrelevant details of the JVM are abstracted away aggressively to reduce the
complexity of the model.
• FJVM abstracts away the complexity of control flow (e.g., unstructured branching, subroutines, etc.) by way of
nondeterminism. In particular, FJVM does not model the execution of a specific bytecode stream, but instead
models all the possible access event sequences that may be generated by the VM when well-typed bytecode
programs are executed. Nevertheless, FJVM explicitly models the evolution of the run-time stack so that stack
invariants may be studied.
• FJVM abstracts away the internal structure of a stack frame, including that of the local variable array and
the operand stack. The only information preserved is the set of references accessible from a stack frame (i.e.
reachability). Nevertheless, FJVM explicitly models data dependencies via type instrumentation. Along with static
annotation, such instrumentation is then made available to the protection mechanism as the basis of access control
decisions.
• FJVM abstracts away destructive updates, but explicitly models reachability (i.e., may reach) and confinement
(i.e. must not reach) in a (possibly cyclic) object graph.
• FJVM abstracts away the concrete identity of methods and fields, but explicitly models execution contexts and
link contexts. For example, we are not so interested in identifying which field of an object contains a reference to
another object, so long as we know some field declared in a certain class does. Similarly, we are not so interested
in identifying which method generates an activation record, so long as we know some method declared in a certain
class does. Execution and link contexts also take into account static annotations: e.g. an object is reachable from
some public field of a class; the stack frame of a method belonging a certain principal is currently in the run-time
stack.
1 A reachability property, or may-reach property, asserts that an object reference may be reachable from some given source (e.g. a field, a class,
a stack frame, etc.). A confinement property, or must-not-reach property, is the negation of reachability.
280 P.W.L. Fong / Science of Computer Programming 67 (2007) 278–300
A novel feature of FJVM is that type-based protection mechanisms are modelled as execution monitors2 [40,
27,12,28,21] with restricted information access [12]. Specifically, FJVM can be customized by a domain-specific
safety policy, which constrains the access event sequences produced by the VM. Adopting the information restriction
approach of [12], such a policy can be seen as an execution monitor that controls access only by consuming
information made available by type instrumentation and static annotation. Safety policies thus formulated model
the effect of imposing a type-based protection mechanism on the run-time environment. To evaluate the effectiveness
of the target protection mechanism, security theorems in the form of stack and confinement invariants can then be
proved for the policy-guarded VM model. Although such a modeling exercise does not establish the soundness of
a bytecode-level type system, it provides a manageable formal model for articulating the structure of the would-be
type system and the security invariants it preserves, and does so without overwhelming the designer with the full
complexity of the JVM bytecode language. Alternatively speaking, the question answered by Featherweight JVM is
not “Does the type system give rise to a certain subset of access event sequences?”, but rather “Suppose my type-
based protection mechanism indeed restricts the access event sequences of the VM in a certain way, what security
theorems can I establish?” FJVM allows the second question to be answered conveniently in an early stage of design.
See Section 7 for future work on addressing the first question for FJVM.
To demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach, a safety policy for Vitek et al.’s Confined Types [44,20,47,48]
has been formulated in Featherweight JVM, and a corresponding confinement theorem for the safety policy has been
established. To reduce the amount of dynamic class loading required for type checking, the safety policy has been
reformulated to reflect a capability-based implementation of Confined Types. The reformulation has been shown to
preserve the confinement theorem. In a separate work [15], FJVM has also been employed to establish the confinement
properties of a capability type system. These results provide first evidence on the utility of Featherweight JVM as an
early modeling tool for evaluating type-based protection mechanisms in a JVM-like environment.
The next section discusses related work. Section 3 offers an exposition of a basic version of FJVM, together with
a soundness theorem for the type instrumentation process. Section 4 builds on the basic model to obtain a policy-
guarded version of FJVM, which supports the incorporation of type-based protection mechanisms. To demonstrate
the utility of the policy-Guarded FJVM, it is employed in Section 5 to model two variants of Confined Types as well
as their corresponding confinement theorems. Section 6 describes ways in which the FJVM models may be extended
to incorporate static members, arrays and exception handling. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
This work is related to various efforts in the formal modelling of the JVM and its bytecode verification process
[22,37]. Moore et al. developed a series of executable JVM models on ACL2 [31,33,32,30]. Nipkow et al. produced
machine-checkable soundness proofs of the JVM bytecode verifier [26,36]. Bo¨rger et al. employed Abstract State
Machines to capture the operational semantics of the JVM [42]. The goal of this work, however, differs from these
previous efforts. While previous work aims at providing increasingly accurate and comprehensive models of the JVM,
the present work strives to distill the aspects of the JVM that are specifically relevant to the study of confinement
properties and stack invariants. A limitation is that, unlike the work mentioned above, this work does not support
machine checkable proofs. This extension belongs to future work (Section 7).
This work is similar in its goal to calculi such as FJ [24], NanoJava [45], andMJ [6], that is, to provide a manageable
formal model for studying new language features. In fact, a design criterion of FJVM has been the following: “how do
we expose enough details of the JVM to facilitate the reasoning of access control and confinement properties, while
keeping the complexity of the resulting model on the scale of FJ?” Thus, inspired by FJ, FJVM is “functional” in the
sense that destructive updates to object fields is not modeled. Links may be introduced by the put event, but thereafter
immutable. Again, like FJ, FJVM focuses on a few interprocedural access events, such as object initialization, field
access, dynamic method dispatching and dynamic typecasting (see Section 6, though, on how other language features
can be added back to the model with ease). However, FJVM differs from FJ in important aspects. The operational
semantics of FJ models the reduction of terms. As FJ terms are inductively specified, the resulting object graph is
acyclic. FJVM execution, however, can spawn object graphs of arbitrary topology. Reachability and confinement
2 An execution monitor is a mechanism by which the dynamic state of a computational process is monitored to determine if execution should be
allowed to continue.
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declared types A, B,C ∈ C
object references p, q, r ∈ O
VM states S, T ::= 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉
object pools Π ::= ∅ | Π ∪ {r : C}
link graphs Γ ::= ∅ | Γ ∪ {p : B ; q : C}
stack frames Φ ::= ∅ | Φ ∪ {r : C}
proper stacks σ ::=  | push(Φ, A,C, σ )
Fig. 1. States for Basic FJVM.
properties thus obtained are more general and natural. Accessibility invariants for FJ are sometimes expressed in
terms of a relation between a term and its subterms [47,48]. In FJVM they are expressed as stack invariants.
An explicit assumption of this work is that the JVM is equipped with some form of type-based protection
mechanism in the style of [43,17,18], which assigns to every program point in an execution trace a type state. The
instrumentation component of FJVM reflects this association of VM states to type states. VM-level type systems have
been proposed for modelling stack inspection [23] and information flow control [4]. These type systems manage the
complexity of the bytecode language by modelling only a representative subset of instructions. The FJVM approach
manages complexity in a radically different manner. By way of nondeterminism, FJVMmodels the VM state from the
perspective of an observer that is not given information about the instruction stream and the program counter. FJVM is
only aware of access events that mutate the topology of the heap, alter the run-time stack, or update the instrumentation
of stack frames. In other words, FJVM is fully compatible with the assumption that a rich set of instructions (including,
for example, subroutines, unstructured branching, intra-procedural data transfer, etc.) is responsible for the generated
execution traces. See Section 7 for further discussion of this point.
Featherweight JVM can be seen as an instance of Security Automata [40]. The latter and its variants [5,27,
28,12] have been employed to characterize security policies. Fong [12] characterizes safety policies by the kind
of information consumed by their enforcing protection mechanisms. This work is an attempt to employ the same
information restriction principle to model the effect of imposing a type-based protection mechanism on JVM-like
environments. This is achieved by restricting safety policies to only consume information made available by a specific
style of static annotation and type instrumentation (i.e. roughly corresponding to typing disciplines enforceable by
iterative dataflow analysis, such as those found in [43,17,18]). The resulting model does not account for all possible
type systems, as that has never been our goal. By contrast, [21] attempts to characterize the classes of all safety policies
enforceable by various enforcement mechanisms, including static analysis as a special case.
Confined Types [44,20,47,48] is originally proposed to provide a stronger measure of encapsulation than what is
available in the standard Java type system. The design goal is to avoid software vulnerabilities caused by reference
leakages. Our first safety policy (Fig. 7) closely mirrors the original formulation of Confined Types [47,48]. The
second, capability-based formulation (Fig. 9) is, to our best knowledge, original. The latter formulation renders type
checking modular. A prototype of such a type checker has been implemented [14] in the framework of Pluggable
Verification Modules [13]. The modelling exercise in Section 5.3 allowed us to uncover and correct some subtle bugs
in the implementation.
3. A basic model of the JVM
3.1. The model
A basic model of the JVM is given in Figs. 1 and 2. Basic FJVM is a nondeterministic production system that
describes how the VM state evolves over time in reaction to access events. Nondeterminism is employed because we
are not modeling the execution of one particular bytecode stream, but rather all possible access events that may be
generated by the VM when well-typed bytecode sequences are executed.
Declared types. The JVM type system tracks only raw reference types, that is, class, interface and array types, without
genericity. Source-level generic types are erased during the compilation process. The VM model described here only
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Φ ` r : C C <: B
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : B}, A, σ 〉 (T-B-WIDEN)
r is a fresh object reference from O
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ∪ {r : B},Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : B}, A, σ 〉 (T-B-NEW)
Φ ` r : C Π ` r : C ′ C ′ <: B
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : B}, A, σ 〉 (T-B-CAST)
Φ ` p : B0 B0 <: B Γ ` p : B ; q : C
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {q : C}, A, σ 〉 (T-B-GET)
Φ ` p : B0 B0 <: B Φ ` q : C
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ∪ {p : B ; q : C};Φ, A, σ 〉 (T-B-PUT)
Φ ` r0 : C0 C0 <: B Φ ` r : C
Π ` r0 : B ′′ B ′′ <: B ′ B ′ <: B
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′, σ ′〉
where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′, r : C} and σ ′ = push(Φ, A,C , σ )
(T-B-INVOKE)
Φ′ ` r : C
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′, σ ′〉 → 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : C}, A, σ 〉
where σ ′ = push(Φ, A,C , σ )
(T-B-RETURN)
Fig. 2. Transitions for Basic FJVM.
accounts for declared types, namely, class and interface types. Array types can be added back to the model with ease
(see Section 6). As usual, A <: B denotes the (reflexive and transitive) subtyping relation of reference types.
Object references. An object reference is an instance of exactly one reference type, called the class of that instance.
An object has an arbitrary number of typed fields, each of which is declared either in the class of the object or in one
of the supertypes. Each field in turn stores an object reference. Inspired by FJ, a field may only be initialized once but
never updated. The null reference is modelled by the absence of link.
VM state. A VM state is a configuration 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉. The components to the left of the semicolon model the
current state of the heap, while those to the right model the stack of the executing thread.
Heap. The object pool Π is a finite set of allocations r : C . Intuitively, Π records the objects that have been allocated
by the VM, together with their classes. The link graph Γ is a finite set of links. A link p : B ; q : C asserts that p has
a field declared in B, with field type C , storing the object reference q. Notice that fields are distinguishable only up to
their declaring reference types, because our primary concern is to model reachability and confinement properties.
Stack. The stack frame is a finite set of labeled references r : C . Such a set models the references accessible in a
JVM stack frame. The internal structure of the JVM stack frame is not modelled, because the data flow between the
local variable array and the operand stack is not our concern. As well, each reference r is associated with a type label
C . We will return to this point in the following. The execution context A is the class in which the executing method
is declared. Consequently, methods are distinguishable only up to their declaring classes. The proper stack σ models
the call chain that leads to the current VM state. Specifically, σ is either an empty stack, , or a non-empty stack,
push(Φ, A,C, σ ), where Φ is the caller stack frame, A is the execution context of the caller (i.e. the class in which
the caller method is declared), C is the declared return type of the callee method, and σ is another proper stack.
Notations.We treat Π , Γ and Φ as finite sets. If x ∈ X , then we write the judgment X ` x , as in Π ` r : C . We also
write x for a list x1, . . . , xk . Obvious variations of these notations shall be clear from the context.
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Instrumentation. FJVM is instrumented. As mentioned before, every reference r stored in a stack frame Φ is tagged
by a type label C , as in Φ ` r : C . The basic type labelling as described here and the custom instrumentation as we
will see in the next section share the following assumptions:
1. The VM is equipped with some form of type-based protection mechanism (e.g. a type system in the style of [43,
17,18]) that assigns to every program point in an execution trace a type state. (A type state assigns a type label to
every member of the local variable array and operand stack in a stack frame.)
2. The said protection mechanism ensures that only some “safe” subset of execution traces will be generated. This
subset is described in terms of constraints over the type states of consecutive program points in execution traces.
Many of the antecedents of the transition rules in Fig. 2 are intended to model the screening effect of this protection
mechanism. The goal of this paper, as pointed out in the introduction, is not to evaluate the soundness of the protection
mechanism: i.e. whether it indeed generates the mentioned subset of execution traces and assigns the right type states
to the program points in the traces. Instead, the goal of modelling here is to explore if the subset of execution traces
as specified by the model preserves a given safety property. This paper argues that such a verification step is relatively
lightweight and provides quick feedback to the designer of a protection mechanism before a full-scale soundness
proof is attempted.
Transition rules. The transition rules in Fig. 2 define the state transition relation →. The production T-B-WIDEN
“promotes” the type label (C) of an object reference (r ) in the stack frame (Φ) to a supertype label (B). This rule does
not model a physical VM event, but instead captures the standard notion of subsumption. The transition rule T-B-NEW
creates a fresh object reference (r ) in the object pool (Π ), and makes that reference accessible in the top stack frame
(Φ). The rule T-B-CAST models dynamic type casting, and tags an object reference (r ) in the stack frame (Φ) with an
alternative type label (B) consistent with the class (C ′) of the object reference. (Note that the original type label C and
the new type label B may or may not relate to one another by subtyping. For an example of the second case, consider
a class C ′ that implements two interfaces C and B that are incomparable in the interface hierarchy.) The production
T-B-GET models field getting, and makes the target (q) of an existing link (p : B ; q : C) accessible in the current
stack frame (Φ) if the source (p) of that link is accessible. The production T-B-PUT models field setting, and creates
a link (p : B ; q : C) between two object references (p, q) accessible in the current stack frame (Φ). Note that field
identity has been abstracted away so that the model reflects every possible behaviour of all properly typed bytecode
programs. Consequently, the transition rule T-B-PUT does not specify a specific field be set. The same can be said
about method identity in the following. The transition rule T-B-INVOKE models dynamic method dispatching: the
caller (A) invokes a method declared in reference type B, with the actual dispatched method defined in reference type
B ′. The transition saves the caller stack frame (Φ), creates a new stack frame (Φ′) for the callee, passes the receiver
(r0 : C0) and the arguments (r : C) from the caller stack frame (Φ) to the callee stack frame (Φ′), and constrains
the return type (C). Notice that the receiver r0 receives a new type label B ′ inside the callee stack frame (Φ′). The
transition rule T-B-RETURN pops the top stack frame (Φ′), resurrects the stack frame (Φ) of the caller (A), and makes
the return value (r : C) available in the caller stack frame.
3.2. A type safety invariant
This section demonstrates that Basic FJVM preserves a notion of type safety: the type instrumentation in the model
is always consistent with the actual class of allocated objects. Intuitively, the following two properties are desired: (i)
every object reference in the object pool is associated with exactly one class, and (ii) every type label appearing in
the object graph or a stack frame is either the class of the labeled reference or a supertype of that class. To this end,
a number of type safety judgments are defined in Fig. 3. The judgment SafeState asserts that a VM state is type safe.
It is defined in terms of four auxiliary judgments. The SafeHeap judgment ensures that every object in the heap has
a unique class. The SafeLinks judgment ensures that the links in the link graph are well formed, in the sense that
an object only contains fields declared in, or inherited by, the class of the object, and that objects are stored only in
compatibly typed fields. The pair of judgments SafeFrame and SafeStack ensure that the stack frames in the run-time
stack contain only type labels consistent with the references they annotate. A notion of type soundness can be proved
for the productions on the basic model.
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∀ p, q, B,C . (Π ` p : B ∧ Π ` q : C) ⇒ (p 6= q ∨ B = C)
SafeHeap(Π )
∀ p, q, B,C, B′ . (Γ ` p : B ; q : C ∧ Π ` p : B′) ⇒ B′ <: B
∀ p, q, B,C,C ′ . (Γ ` p : B ; q : C ∧ Π ` q : C ′) ⇒ C ′ <: C
SafeLinks(Γ |Π )
∀ r,C,C ′ . (Φ ` r : C ∧ Π ` r : C ′) ⇒ C ′ <: C
SafeFrame(Φ |Π )
SafeStack( |Π )
SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) SafeStack(σ |Π )
SafeStack(push(Φ, A,C, σ ) |Π )
SafeHeap(Π ) SafeLinks(Γ |Π ) SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) SafeStack(σ |Π )
SafeState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A, σ 〉)
Fig. 3. Type safety judgments.
declared types A, B,C ∈ C
field designators f, g ∈ F
method designators m, n ∈ M
type annotations α, β, γ ∈ A
object references p, q, r ∈ O
VM states S, T ::= 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉
object pools Π ::= ∅ | Π ∪ {r : C}
link graphs Γ ::= ∅ | Γ ∪ {p : B f; q : C}
stack frames Φ ::= ∅ | Φ ∪ {r : Cγ }
proper stacks σ ::=  | push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ )
access events e ∈ E ::= widen(Cγ )(Bβ)
| new〈Bβ〉
| cast〈Bβ〉(Cγ )
| get〈B. f : Cγ 〉(B0β)
| put〈B. f : Cγ 〉(B0β)
| invoke〈B.n : Cγ /β → Cβ/γ 〉[B ′.n′](C0γ0/β0)
Fig. 4. States for Guarded FJVM.
Theorem 1 (One-Step Soundness).
∀ S, T . ( S → T ∧ SafeState(S) ) ⇒ SafeState(T )
A proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
4. Custom instrumentation and policy enforcement
Basic FJVM provides a framework for articulating the dynamic behaviour of the JVM. Our original goal, however,
is to evaluate the effect of constraining the VM behaviour via a type-based protection mechanism, and see if the type
constraints are strong enough to uphold a given safety property. To this end, Basic FJVM is elaborated into Guarded
FJVM (Figs. 4 and 5), which explicitly provides “hooks” for introducing behavioural constraints that are expressed in
terms of domain-specific instrumentation.
Field and method designators. In Basic FJVM, fields and methods are distinguishable only up to their declaring
classes. In some verification domains, one may desire further differentiation (e.g. based on static annotations). It is
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Φ ` r : Cγ C <: B
widen(Cγ )(Bβ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Bβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-G-WIDEN)
r is a fresh object reference from O
new〈Bβ〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ∪ {r : B},Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Bβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-G-NEW)
Φ ` r : Cγ Π ` r : C ′ C ′ <: B
cast〈Bβ〉(Cγ ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Bβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-G-CAST)
Φ ` p : B0β B0 <: B Γ ` p : B f; q : C
get〈B. f : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {q : Cγ }, A.m, σ 〉
(T-G-GET)
Φ ` p : B0β B0 <: B Φ ` q : Cγ
put〈B. f : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ∪ {p : B f; q : C};Φ, A.m, σ 〉
(T-G-PUT)
Φ ` r0 : C0γ0 C0 <: B Φ ` r : Cγ
Π ` r0 : B ′′ B ′′ <: B ′ B ′ <: B
invoke〈B.n : Cγ /β → Cβ/γ 〉[B ′.n′](C0γ0/β0) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′.n′, σ ′〉
where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′β0 , r : Cβ} and σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ )
(T-G-INVOKE)
Φ′ ` r : Cβ
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′.n′, σ ′〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Cγ }, A.m, σ 〉
where σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ )
(T-G-RETURN)
Fig. 5. Transitions for Guarded FJVM.
thus assumed that fields are partitioned into a finite or countably infinite number of equivalence classes (e.g. public,
protected, etc.). Fields belonging to the same equivalence class are indistinguishable from the perspective of policy
enforcement. The exact set of equivalence classes is domain-dependent. Each equivalence class is identified by a
unique field designator. Method designators are defined in a similar manner. A number of notational revisions are
necessitated by the introduction of field and method designators. Firstly, links are now annotated by field designators,
as in p : B f; q : C . (When |F | = 1 for a verification domain, the link annotation can be omitted.) Secondly, the
execution context of a method is identified not only by the class in which the method is declared, but also its method
designator, as in A.m. (Again, if |M| = 1 then an execution context can be identified solely by the declaring class of
the method.)
Annotated type labels. Recall that references accessible from a stack frame are labeled by a type label, as in
Φ ` r : C . We now allow the instrumentation process to track data dependencies via the use of type annotations, as
in Φ ` r : Cγ . Whenever a labeled reference is introduced into the top stack frame, as in the cases of T-G-WIDEN,
T-G-NEW, T-G-CAST, and T-G-GET, a type annotation is attached to the type label. The type annotation is erased
when the labelled reference is stored in a field via T-G-PUT. The most complex of all the transition rules are the pair
T-G-INVOKE and T-G-RETURN. As in other transition rules, when arguments (r : Cγ ) are passed into the callee
stack frame (Φ′), their type labels acquire a new set of type annotations (r : Cβ ). These annotations may differ from
those in the caller stack frame (Φ). When a method returns, the return value (r ) is introduced into the caller stack
frame (Φ), and as such its type label (C) receives a new type annotation (γ ) that may differ from the one (β) in the
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callee stack frame (Φ′). A subtle point is that the type annotation of the return object reference is decided at the time
when the method is invoked (just as the type label of the return reference is decided at method invocation time). In
Basic FJVM (Figs. 1 and 2), method invocation pushes into the run-time stack the return type label C . In Guarded
FJVM, a doubly decorated type label Cβ/γ is pushed into the stack. The meaning is that (1) the callee must return
an object reference with annotated type label Cβ , and that (2) the returned object reference will be pushed into the
caller stack frame with annotated type label Cγ . The transition rules T-G-INVOKE and T-G-RETURN are designed to
jointly produce this behaviour. (As usual, if |A| = 1 then all type annotations may be omitted.)
Policy enforcement. The purpose of the aforementioned apparatus is to allow us to control the execution traces that
the VM generates. In the Guarded FJVM, the transition relation→Σ is parameterized by a safety policy Σ . A safety
policy is a function with signature C ×M → 2E , where 2E denotes the powerset of the set of events E that may be
generated by the VM. Intuitively, a policy Σ specifies for each execution context A.m the set Σ [A.m] of permitted
events. The transition rules in Fig. 5 ensure that every transition produced by →Σ satisfies the parameter policy Σ .
One may instantiate the model by a concrete policy, and then verify if some global safety property (in the form of a
state invariant) is preserved by the transitions.
Following the spirit of [12], we constrain the kind of information that may be consumed by the underlying
protection mechanism for the purpose of access control. Event signatures have been carefully designed so that a
safety policy may only control execution by examining type instrumentation and static annotation. Two transitions
involving the same type instrumentation and static annotation are indistinguishable from the point of view of the
safety policy. Information such as object identity, dynamic types and link graph topology are intentionally hidden
from the protection mechanism. This set up allows us to model the effect of imposing a purely type-based protection
mechanism.
5. Example: Confined Types
In this section, we look at how Guarded FJVM may be used to evaluate a realistic type system with security
application. Specifically, we will examine two formulations of Confined Types, and attempt to establish a Confinement
Theorem for each formulation. This modelling exercise allows us to point out a number of subtle implementation
issues if Confined Types is to be enforced at the bytecode level.
5.1. Confined Types from 20,000 feet
At the core of the Java security infrastructure is a strong type system, which provides nonbypassable encapsulation
boundaries for controlling access to privileged services and sensitive data. To appreciate the connection between
encapsulation and security, recall that the soundness of the JVM type system guarantees no type confusion may occur,
and thus the security manager is properly encapsulated, and consequently untrusted code outside of the platform
library cannot tamper with the private state of the authorization procedure. Both the Java source language and the
JVM bytecode language support access control modifiers (e.g. public, protected, etc.) for enforcing the usual
notion of data encapsulation. The standard Java platform, however, offers no provision for enforcing the stronger
notion of reference encapsulation. The lack of programmatic support for preventing accidental reference leaking has
led to a security breach in the java.security package of JDK 1.1 [44].
The idea of Confined Types [44,20,47,48] was proposed as a lightweight annotation system for supporting reference
encapsulation in a Java-like safe language. It has been shown convincingly that proper adoption of Confined Types in
Java could have prevented the aforementioned security breach [44]. A class or interface type may be declared to be
confined. The typing discipline ensures the following property:
Confinement Property (Informal) [47,48]. An object of Confined Type is encapsulated within its defining scope
[i.e. package].
Confined Types enforces the typing discipline of Fig. 6 (adopted from [48], with minor editing). The idea of an
anonymous method requires explanation. A confined object may be leaked outside of its package when it acts as the
receiver (i.e. this) of a method invocation in which the dispatched method is one that has been inherited from a
non-confined superclass. Completely disallowing this will render the typing discipline too restrictive. The idea of an
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C1 A Confined Type must not appear in the type of a public (or protected) field or the return type of a public (or
protected) method.
C2 A Confined Type must not be public.
C3 Methods invoked on an expression of confined type must either be defined in a confined class or be anonymous
methods.
C4 Subtypes of a Confined Type must be confined [in the same package as the Confined Type].
C5 Confined Types can be widened only to other Confined Types.
C6 Overriding must preserve anonymity of methods.
A1 [In an anonymous method,] the this reference is used only to select fields and as the receiver in the invocation
of other anonymous methods.
Fig. 6. Type rules for Confined Types [48].
anonymous method is therefore introduced. Essentially, an anonymous method promises the classes which inherit the
method that the this reference will never be stored into a field. As such, method anonymity is closely related to
Boyland’s borrowed receiver [7].
5.2. A safety policy for Confined Types
We encode the type rules of Fig. 6 into a safety policy for Guarded FJVM (Fig. 7).
5.2.1. Notation
Reference types are either public or package private. We use the predicate public(C) to assert that C is public.
Following [47,48], type rule C2 is modeled by identifying the package private classes with the confined classes. The
following shorthand is therefore defined:
confined(C) , ¬public(C)
We write B ≈ C to assert that reference types B and C belong to the same package. We define the relation, C F B to
assert that C is visible to B.
C F B , public(C) ∨ B ≈ C
Notice that the visibility relation (F) is not transitive. (To see this, consider declared types A, B and C such that
B ≈ C , A 6≈ C , confined(C) and public(B). We thus have C F B and B F A but not C F A.) We define a transitive
variant of the visibility relation:
C I B , public(C) ∨ (confined(B) ∧ B ≈ C)
The following properties can be easily verified:
C I C (1)
C I B ∧ B I A ⇒ C I A (2)
C I A ⇒ C F A (3)
C F C (4)
C I B ∧ B F A ⇒ C F A (5)
We postulate that the underlying protection mechanism enforces type rule C4 when a class is defined by a class loader:
C ′ <: C ⇒ C I C ′ (6)
Following [47,48], all fields and methods are assumed to be public to simplify discussion. A field (or method) is
encapsulated by being declared in a confined reference type. To facilitate the enforcement of the type rules C3 and
A1, method designators are defined to indicate if a given method is declared by the programmer to be anonymous:
m ::= anon | anon
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B F A γ <: β C I B ∨ (β 6= this ∧ m = anon)
widen(Cγ )(Bβ) ∈ Σ [A.m] (P-CT-WIDEN)
B F A β = this
new〈Bβ〉 ∈ Σ [A.m] (P-CT-NEW)
B F A γ <: β C I B ∨ (β 6= this ∧ m = anon)
cast〈Bβ〉(Cγ ) ∈ Σ [A.m] (P-CT-CAST)
B F A C I B γ = this
get〈B : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
(P-CT-GET)
B F A C I B γ = this ∨ m 6= anon
put〈B : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
(P-CT-PUT)
B F A n = anon⇒ n′ = anon
(C0 I B ∧ (γ0 = this ∨ m 6= anon)) ∨ n = anon
∀i > 0 . (Ci I B ∧ (γi = this ∨ m 6= anon))
β0 = this ∀i > 0 . βi = this
C I B β = this ∨ n′ 6= anon γ = this
invoke〈B.n : Cγ /β → Cβ/γ 〉[B ′.n′](C0γ0/β0) ∈ Σ [A.m]
(P-CT-INVOKE)
Fig. 7. A safety policy for Confined Types.
No field designator needs to be defined, and thus we will omit field designators in our further discussion. Three type
annotations are defined to track if a given reference is the this pseudo-parameter of a method:
α, β, γ ::= > | this | this
The type annotation > indicates no information for the underlying reference, while this (resp. this) indicates that the
underlying reference is (resp. is not) the this pseudo-parameter of a method. These type annotations are not supplied
by the programmer. Instead, they are generated and tracked by the underlying type-based protection mechanism (e.g.
via dataflow analysis). A subsumption relation <: is defined for the type annotations, so that <: is a partial ordering
with > being the maximal element:
this <: > this <: >
5.2.2. Safety policy
A safety policy for Confined Types is formulated in Fig. 7, which captures the effect of imposing the type rules in
Fig. 6. The type rule C1 is enforced by the antecedent C I B of P-CT-GET, P-CT-PUT and P-CT-INVOKE, ensuring
that confined objects are never exposed by an unprotected field or returned by an unprotected method. The type rule
C3 is enforced in P-CT-INVOKE by the antecedent (C0 I B∧. . .)∨n = anon, which requires that a confined receiver
can temporarily escape from its confinement domain only if the invoked method is anonymous. The policy rules P-
CT-WIDEN and P-CT-CAST enforce a slightly relaxed version of C5, so that a confined reference may be widened
or casted to a nonconfined one only if it is the anonymous this. The type rule C6 is enforced in P-CT-INVOKE
by the antecedent n = anon ⇒ n′ = anon, which mandates that method dispatching preserves anonymity in the
execution context. To enforce type rule A1, the antecedent γ = this ∨ m 6= anon is required in P-CT-PUT so that an
anonymous method cannot store this into a field. Similarly, the antecedent ∀i > 0 . (. . .∧ (γi = this∨m 6= anon))
disallows the passing of an anonymous this as method arguments. Within the same policy rule, the antecedent
β = this ∨ n′ 6= anon forbids the returning of an anonymous this.
A number of subtle requirements in the policy of Fig. 7 are not explicitly mandated by the type rules of Fig. 6.
Nevertheless, they are instrumental in the proof of the confinement theorem. The antecedent B F A as found in all the
policy rules is enforced by the JVM at the time of constant pool resolution [29, Sect. 5.4.3]. This property is exploited
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∀p, q, B,C . Γ ` p : B ; q : C ⇒ C I B
∀p, q, B,C,C ′ . (Γ ` p : B ; q : C ∧ Π ` q : C ′) ⇒ C ′ I C
ConfinedLinks(Γ |Π )
∀r,C . Φ ` r : Cγ ⇒ C F A
∀r,C,C ′ . (Φ ` r : Cγ ∧Π ` r : C ′)
⇒ (C ′ I C ∨ (γ 6= this ∧ m = anon))
ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m)
ConfinedStack( |Π , A.m)
C F A β = this ∨ n′ 6= anon γ = this
ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m) ConfinedStack(σ |Π , A.m)
ConfinedStack(push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ ) |Π , B′.n′)
ConfinedLinks(Γ |Π )
ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m) ConfinedStack(σ |Π , A.m)
ConfinedState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉)
Fig. 8. Confinement judgments.
in the confinement proof. The antecedent ∀i > 0 . (Ci I B ∧ . . .) in P-CT-INVOKE mandates that methods may only
receive arguments from safe origins.3 Furthermore, it is required that the anonymous this may be the receiver of a
method call only if the target method is anonymous (see the antecedent (. . . ∧ (γ0 = this ∨ m 6= anon)) ∨ n = anon
of P-CT-INVOKE).
5.2.3. Confinement Theorem
The goal of imposing the safety policy of Fig. 7 is to ensure that the Confinement Property (Informal) of
Section 5.1 is satisfied. Formally, given a VM state 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉, we want the following properties to hold:
∀p, q, B, B ′,C,C ′ . ( Γ ` p : B ; q : C ∧ Π ` p : B ′ ∧ Π ` q : C ′ ) ⇒ C ′ F B ′ (7)
∀p,C,C ′, γ . ( Φ ` p : Cγ ∧ Π ` p : C ′ ∧ (γ = this ∨ m 6= anon) ) ⇒ C ′ F A (8)
Property (7) asserts that instances of confined classes are only stored in fields declared within the same package. Prop-
erty (8) states that, except for an anonymous this, confined objects remain in the stack frame of methods declared in
the same package. To enforce the above properties, we postulate the state invariant ConfinedState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉)
as specified in Fig. 8.
Proposition 2. If both SafeState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉) and ConfinedState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉) hold, then properties
(7) and (8) hold.
Proof. Property (7) follows from ConfinedLinks(Γ |Π ) and SafeLinks(Γ |Π ) via (2), (6), and (3). Property (8)
follows from ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m) via (5).
Analogous to One-Step Soundness (Theorem 1), the following Confinement Theorem can be proved:
Theorem 3 (Confinement).
∀ S, T . ( S →Σ T ∧ SafeState(S) ∧ ConfinedState(S) ) ⇒ ConfinedState(T ).
See Appendix B for a proof of this theorem. Notice, in particular, the mild complexity of the proof.
3 A weaker antecedent ∀i > 0 . (Ci F B′ ∧ . . .) will also do. The stronger antecedent was adopted for notational uniformity.
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5.3. A capability-based safety policy for Confined Types
5.3.1. Motivation
The above formulation of Confined Types closely mirrors the type rules of Fig. 6. Although the safety policy in
Fig. 7 successfully preserves the Confinement Property, the price of enforcing such a safety policy at link time is
nontrivial. To understand this cost, a reference type C is said to be an auxiliary type for reference type A if C appears
in the constant pool of A as a field type, or a method parameter or return type. To enforce the above safety policy at
link time, auxiliary types for A must be loaded in order for the type checker to confirm their confined-ness. As the
loading of auxiliary classes is not mandated by the JVM Specification [29], such an eager class loading strategy could
slow down the start up time of an application, and increase the memory footprint of the VM unnecessarily.
In this section, we explore an alternative formulation of Confined Types based on the notion of capability types
[10,8]. Intuitively, rather than relying on class loading to confirm the confined-ness of auxiliary types, every auxiliary
type is explicitly annotated by a capability that provides an estimate of the type’s confined-ness. We envisage that
this capability annotation is generated by the code producer using a customized compiler. Although the capabilities
are only estimates, and neither the code producer nor the compiler is to be trusted, nevertheless the design of the
typing discipline is such that a classfile that is not honest about the annotations will fail to type check. As we shall see
in Section 5.3.5, the availability of these estimates effectively reduces the amount of class loading. Implementation
details for this approach can be found in [14]. This capability-based formulation of Confined Types is formalized in
the following, with the dual purpose of establishing its confinement guarantee as well as demonstrating the utility of
FJVM.
5.3.2. Notation
A partially-ordered set of capabilities are defined to track the confined-ness of references.
α, β, γ ::= ⊥ | conf | anon
⊥ <: conf <: anon
The capability ⊥ is used for tagging references that are believed to be public, and the conf capability for confined
references. References tagged with anon may temporarily escape from its confinement domain as a method receiver
so long as it is never deposited into a field. We postulate that field types, method parameter types (including the
pseudo-parameter this) and method return types are all annotated with these capabilities. It is assumed that a custom
compiler will compile source-level Confined Type annotations into these capability annotations, and subsequently
inject them into the generated classfile.
We use field designators to record the capability annotations of fields.
f, g ::= γ
As we shall see, the safety policy will not permit the use of anon to annotate fields. Similarly, method designators
record the capability annotation of the pseudo-parameter this.
m, n ::= γ
An anonymous method is represented by having a method designator anon. If a method designator is not anon, then
it is an estimate of the confined-ness of this. Again, annotations represented by field and method designators are
generated by the compiler.





We define a variant of the visibility relation in terms of capability type annotations:
Cγ F: B , γ = ⊥ ∨ C ≈ B
As before, a transitive variant of visibility is also defined:
Cγ I: Bβ , γ <: β ∧ (γ 6= conf ∨ β 6= conf ∨ C ≈ B)
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BβF: A ∨ β = anon Cγ I: Bβ
widen(Cγ )(Bβ) ∈ Σ [A.α] (P-CAP-WIDEN)
B∗F: A
new〈B∗〉 ∈ Σ [A.α] (P-CAP-NEW)
BβF: A ∨ β = anon Cγ I: Bβ
cast〈Bβ〉(Cγ ) ∈ Σ [A.α] (P-CAP-CAST)
B∗F: A Cγ I: B∗
get〈B.γ : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.α]
(P-CAP-GET)
B∗F: A Cγ I: B∗
put〈B.γ : Cγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.α]
(P-CAP-PUT)
B∗F: A C0γ0 I: Bβ0 Bβ0 I: B ′β ′0
∀i > 0 . Ci γi I: B∗ Cγ I: B∗
invoke〈B.β0 : Cγ /γ → Cγ /γ 〉[B ′.β ′0](C0γ0/β
′
0) ∈ Σ [A.α]
(P-CAP-INVOKE)
Fig. 9. A capability-based safety policy for Confined Types.
The following properties can be easily validated:
Cγ I: Cγ (9)
Cγ I: Bβ ∧ Bβ I: Aα ⇒ Cγ I: Aα (10)
C∗ I: B∗ ⇔ C I B (11)
Cγ I: B∗ ⇒ Cγ F: B (12)
Cγ I: Bβ ∧ BβF: A ⇒ Cγ F: A (13)
C∗F: B ⇔ C F B (14)
BβF: B ∨ β = anon (15)
5.3.3. Safety policy
A capability-based safety policy for Confined Types is given in Fig. 9. This policy is significantly cleaner than the
previous one.4 Notice that accesses are granted by examining not the actual confined-ness of auxiliary types (i.e. field
types, and method parameter and return types), but rather type labels annotated with capabilities. This effectively cuts
down the amount of class loading required to type check a method body.
5.3.4. Confinement theorem revisited
The goal of confinement is still to uphold property (7), plus property (8) adapted as follows:
∀p,C,C ′, γ . ( Φ ` p : Cγ ∧ Π ` p : C ′ ∧ γ 6= anon ) ⇒ C ′ F A. (16)
To accommodate the variation in notation and confinement goals, the confinement invariant has been reformulated, as
shown in Fig. 10. Again, we assert that the invariant establishes the confinement goals.
Proposition 4. If both SafeState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.α, σ 〉) and ConfinedStatecap(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.α, σ 〉) hold, then properties
(7) and (16) hold.
4 An alternative formulation of the invoke policy rule would have the antecedent ∀i > 0 . Cγii I: B∗ replaced by the weaker condition
∀i > 0 . Cγii F: B′. The stronger antecedent was adopted for notational uniformity.
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∀p, q, B,C . Γ ` p : B γ; q : C ⇒ Cγ I: B∗
∀p, q, B,C,C ′ . (Γ ` p : B γ; q : C ∧ Π ` q : C ′) ⇒ C ′∗ I: Cγ
ConfinedLinkscap(Γ |Π )
∀r,C . Φ ` r : Cγ ⇒ (Cγ F: A ∨ γ = anon)
∀r,C,C ′ . (Φ ` r : Cγ ∧Π ` r : C ′) ⇒ C ′∗ I: Cγ
ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A)
ConfinedStackcap( |Π )
Cγ F: A
ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A) ConfinedStackcap(σ |Π )
ConfinedStackcap(push(Φ, A.α,Cγ /γ , σ ) |Π )
ConfinedLinkscap(Γ |Π )
ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A) ConfinedStackcap(σ |Π )
ConfinedStatecap(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.α, σ 〉)
Fig. 10. Revised confinement judgments.
Proof. Property (7) follows from ConfinedLinkscap(Γ |Π ) and SafeLinks(Γ |Π ) via (10), (11), (6), (2), and (3).
Property (8) follows from ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A) via (13) and (14).
A revised confinement theorem can be proved:
Theorem 5 (Confinement (Revised)).
∀ S, T . ( S →Σ T ∧ SafeState(S) ∧ ConfinedStatecap(S) ) ⇒ ConfinedStatecap(T ).
See Appendix C for the proof of this theorem.
5.3.5. Benefits of reformulation
We started by promising that the capability-based reformulation reduces the amount of class loading performed
by the link-time type checking algorithm. With the original formulation, every time the checks C I B and C F B
are carried out, class loading must be performed in order for the type checker to figure out the confined-ness of
the classes C and B. With the capability-based reformulation, class loading is not always necessary. For example,
checking Cγ I: Bβ sometimes involves only the comparison of capability labels. It is only when (i) both γ and β are
conf, (ii) the fully qualified names of B and C are different, and (iii) B and C share the same name qualification, that
we need to load the definitions of B and C to verify if they belong to the same run-time package.5 Class loading can
be avoided in all other cases.
6. Extensions
To facilitate exposition, several key features of the JVM have been abstracted away in the previous discussion.
This section examines a number of extensions to Guarded FJVM, including static fields, static methods, arrays and
exception handling. The resulting VMmodel, Extended FJVM is summarized in Figs. 11–14. The goal of this exercise
is to demonstrate that the modelling approach adopted so far applies equally well to other aspects of the JVM.
A cross-cutting extension is that array types are explicitly modelled. Reference types are either declared types or
array types (Fig. 11). The subtyping relation is extended to model the covariant array subtyping rule of the JVM type
system (Fig. 12). As a result of this extension, field types, method return types and formal parameter types can be
arbitrary reference types instead of mere declared types. The change is reflected in Fig. 13, which shows a revision
of the transition rules inherited from Guarded FJVM. To simplify the model, it is assumed that no array type is a
5 The run-time package of a class or an interface is uniquely determined by the package name and the defining class loader of the class or
interface [29, Sect. 5.3].
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declared types A, B,C ∈ C
reference types P, Q, R ::= A | R [ ]
field designators f, g ∈ F
method designators m, n ∈ M
type annotations α, β, γ ∈ A
object references p, q, r ∈ O
VM states S, T ::= 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉
object pools Π ::= ∅ | Π ∪ {r : R}
link graphs Γ ::= ∅
| Γ ∪ {B f; q : R}
| Γ ∪ {p : B f; q : R}
| Γ ∪ {p : [ ]; q}
stack frames Φ ::= ∅ | Φ ∪ {r : Rγ }
proper stacks σ ::=  | push(Φ, A.m, Rβ/γ , σ )
access events e ∈ E ::= widen(Rγ )(Qβ)
| new〈Bβ〉
| cast〈Qβ〉(Rγ )
| get〈B. f : Rγ 〉(B0β)
| put〈B. f : Rγ 〉(B0β)
| invoke〈B.n : Rγ /β → Rβ/γ 〉[B ′.n′](C0γ0/β0)
| getstatic〈B. f : Rγ 〉
| putstatic〈B. f : Rγ 〉
| invokestatic〈B.n : Rγ /β → Rβ/γ 〉
| newarray〈R[ ]γ 〉
| getarray(R[ ]γ )(Rβ)
| putarray(R[ ]γ )(Rβ)
| throw(Cγ )(Bβ)
Fig. 11. States for Extended FJVM.
R <: R
P <: Q Q <: R
P <: R
P <: Q
P[ ] <: Q[ ]
unwind(Φ, A.m, σ ; Φ, A.m, σ )
unwind(Φ′, A′.m′, σ ′ ; Φ′′, A′′.m′′, σ ′′)
unwind(Φ, A.m, push(Φ′, A′.m′, R′β/γ , σ ′) ; Φ′′, A′′.m′′, σ ′′)
Fig. 12. Auxiliary judgments for Extended FJVM.
subtype of any declared type. This assumption does not fully reflect the type structure of the JVM, but its adoption
significantly simplifies the model.
New transitions are defined in Fig. 14. To model static fields, a link graph carries global links of the form
B
f
; q : R. The transitions T-E-GETSTATIC, T-E-PUTSTATIC and T-E-INVOKESTATIC are straightforward
simplifications of T-E-GET, T-E-PUT and T-E-INVOKE. A recurring motif is that link and execution contexts are
distinguishable only up to field and method designators respectively. The identity of concrete fields and methods is
abstracted away. As well, destructive updates are not modelled, and control flow remains nondeterministic.
To model arrays, a link graph records array links of the form p : [ ] ; q . Array creation, read and write
are modelled respectively by the transitions T-E-NEWARRAY, T-E-GETARRAY and T-E-PUTARRAY. Notice that,
because array subtyping is covariant, and thus unsound, the JVM performs a dynamic check when a reference is
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Φ ` r : Rγ R <: Q
widen(Rγ )(Qβ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Qβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-WIDEN)
r is a fresh object reference from O
new〈Bβ〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ∪ {r : B},Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Bβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-NEW)
Φ ` r : Rγ Π ` r : R′ R′ <: Q
cast〈Qβ〉(Rγ ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Qβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-CAST)
Φ ` p : B0β B0 <: B Γ ` p : B f; q : R
get〈B. f : Rγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {q : Rγ }, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-GET)
Φ ` p : B0β B0 <: B Φ ` q : Rγ
put〈B. f : Rγ 〉(B0β) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ∪ {p : B f; q : R};Φ, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-PUT)
Φ ` r0 : C0γ0 C0 <: B Φ ` r : Rγ
Π ` r0 : B ′′ B ′′ <: B ′ B ′ <: B
invoke〈B.n : Rγ /β → Rβ/γ 〉[B ′.n′](C0γ0/β0) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′.n′, σ ′〉
where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′β0 , r : Rβ} and σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m, Rβ/γ , σ )
(T-E-INVOKE)
Φ′ ` r : Rβ
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′.n′, σ ′〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : Rγ }, A.m, σ 〉
where σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m, Rβ/γ , σ )
(T-E-RETURN)
Fig. 13. Revised transitions for Extended FJVM.
stored into an array. This dynamic check is explicitly modeled in T-E-PUTARRAY. As in the rest of this paper,
our concerns are reachability and confinement properties. Array capacity and indexing are abstracted away; only
reachability information is preserved.
Lastly, to model exception handling, an auxiliary judgment unwind is defined to capture stack unwinding (Fig. 12).
Throughout this work, the intricacy of control flow has been abstracted away by non-determinism. Here, stack
unwinding is also performed non-deterministically. One of the stack frames in the call chain is selected to catch the
exception with an appropriate catch type. The choices of the stack frame and the catch type are both nondeterministic.
Given the revised SafeState judgment in Fig. 15, one can easily show that the formulation of Extended FJVM
preserves One-Step Soundness:
Theorem 6 (One-Step Soundness (extended)).
∀ S, T . ( S →Σ T ∧ SafeState(S) ) ⇒ SafeState(T ).
A proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix D.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper a lightweight formal model of JVM-like environments is proposed for evaluating the effectiveness
of type-based protection mechanisms at an early stage of design. A rational reconstruction of Confined Types at the
JVM bytecode level is presented, and this formulation is verified to successfully enforce the Confinement Property.
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Γ ` B f; q : R
getstatic〈B. f : Rγ 〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {q : Rγ }, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-GETSTATIC)
Φ ` q : Rγ
getstatic〈B. f : Rγ 〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ∪ {B f; q : R};Φ, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-PUTSTATIC)
Φ ` r : Rγ
invokestatic〈B ′.n′ : Rγ /β → Rβ/γ 〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′, B ′.n′, σ ′〉
where Φ′ = {r : Rγ } and σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m, Rβ/γ , σ )
(T-E-INVOKESTATIC)
r is a fresh object reference from O
newarray〈R[ ]γ 〉 ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ∪ {r : R[ ]},Γ ;Φ ∪ {r : R[ ]γ }, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-NEWARRAY)
Φ ` p : R[ ]γ Γ ` p : [ ]; q
getarray(R[ ]γ )(Rβ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ ∪ {q : Rβ}, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-GETARRAY)
Φ ` p : R[ ]γ Φ ` q : Rβ
Π ` p : P[ ] Π ` q : Q Q <: P
putarray(R[ ]γ )(Rβ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ∪ {p : [ ]; q};Φ, A.m, σ 〉
(T-E-PUTARRAY)
Φ ` r : Cγ Π ` r : C ′ C ′ <: B
unwind(Φ, A.m, σ ; Φ′, A′.m′, σ ′)
throw(Cγ )(Bβ) ∈ Σ [A.m]
〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉 →Σ 〈Π ,Γ ;Φ′ ∪ {r : Bβ}, A′.m′, σ ′〉
(T-E-THROW)
Fig. 14. New transitions for Extended FJVM.
Also articulated is a novel capability-based reformulation of Confined Types that can reduce the amount of class
loading at type checking time. TheConfinement Property is preserved by this alternative formulation. This paper has
therefore provided first evidence on the utility of FJVM as a tool for lightweight evaluation of type-based protection
mechanisms. Lastly, it has been demonstrated that FJVM can be extended to model language features such as static
members, arrays and exception handling.
A number of future directions are suggested by this work. First, the author is particularly interested in the
application of type-based access control mechanisms to enforce security properties at the bytecode level. The
Featherweight JVM will be employed to validate early designs. [15] represents a first example of this approach.
Second, the author plans to establish the soundness of FJVM with respect to a more standard operational semantic
model of the JVM, so that stack invariants and confinement properties established in the FJVM can be transferred to
the semantic model. To this end, the following plan will be adopted. A family of type systems will be defined over
the standard semantic model of the JVM. A standard translation of the instances of this type system family to their
corresponding FJVM safety policies will be specified. It will then be shown that stack invariants and reachability
properties provable in the standard semantic model are preserved in the policy-Guarded FJVM. This amounts to
showing that FJVM is an abstract interpretation of a standard VM model. Notice that the nondeterministic nature of
FJVM is compatible with a semantic model equipped with a rich set of control transfer primitives. The link graph
can be seen as an abstraction of the heap, in which only may-reach information is tracked. Third, the author plans to
embed FJVM into a programming logic such as ACL2 [25], so as to provide mechanized theorem proving support to
the users of FJVM.
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∀ p, q, P, Q . (Π ` p : P ∧ Π ` q : Q) ⇒ (p 6= q ∨ P = Q)
SafeHeap(Π )
∀ p, q, f, B, Q, B′ . (Γ ` p : B f; q : Q ∧ Π ` p : B′) ⇒ B′ <: B
∀ p, q, f, B, Q, Q′ . (Γ ` p : B f; q : Q ∧ Π ` q : Q′) ⇒ Q′ <: Q
∀ p, q, P, Q . (Γ ` p : [ ]; q ∧ Π ` p : P[ ] ∧ Π ` q : Q) ⇒ Q <: P
SafeLinks(Γ |Π )
∀ r, R, R′ . (Φ ` r : Rγ ∧ Π ` r : R′) ⇒ R′ <: R
SafeFrame(Φ |Π )
SafeStack( |Π )
SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) SafeStack(σ |Π )
SafeStack(push(Φ, A.m, Rβ/γ , σ ) |Π )
SafeHeap(Π ) SafeLinks(Γ |Π ) SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) SafeStack(σ |Π )
SafeState(〈Π ,Γ ;Φ, A.m, σ 〉)
Fig. 15. Extended type safety judgments.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
We confirm SafeState(T ) by a case analysis on the transition rule employed to obtain S → T .
Case T-B-WIDEN: To show SafeFrame(Φ ∪{r : B} |Π ), notice that SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) ensures C ′ <: C if C ′ is the
class of r . As T-B-WIDEN guarantees C <: B, we obtain, by transitivity, C ′ <: B as required.
Case T-B-NEW: Because r is a fresh object reference from O, SafeHeap(Π ∪ {r : B}) holds trivially. As well,
SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} |Π ∪ {r : B}) holds because B <: B.
Case T-B-CAST: To see SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} |Π ), observe that T-B-CAST explicitly requires the antecedents
Π ` r : C ′ and C ′ <: B.
Case T-B-GET: To see SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {q : C} |Π ), notice that T-B-GET guarantees Γ ` p : B ; q : C , which,
by SafeLinks(Γ |Π ), implies that C ′ <: C when Π ` q : C ′.
Case T-B-PUT: We show SafeLinks(Γ ∪{p : B ; q : C} |Π ) in two steps. First, by SafeFrame(Φ |Π ),Π ` q : C ′
implies C ′ <: C as required. Second, by SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) again, Π ` p : B ′ implies B ′ <: B0. As T-B-
PUT guarantees B0 < B, the latter in turn implies B ′ <: B as required.
Case T-B-INVOKE: We need to show SafeFrame(Φ′ |Π ) and SafeStack(σ ′ |Π ).
To show SafeFrame(Φ′ |Π ), where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′, r : C}, notice the following two points. Firstly, T-B-
INVOKE guaranteesΦ ` r : C , which, by SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) implies thatC ′i <: Ci follows fromΠ ` ri : C ′i .
Secondly, T-B-INVOKE guarantees that Π ` r0 : B ′′ and B ′′ <: B ′ hold simultaneously.
To show SafeStack(σ ′ |Π ), where σ ′ = push(Φ, A,C, σ ), notice that both SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) and Safe-
Stack(σ |Π ) are given by the precondition.
Case T-B-RETURN: First, SafeStack(σ |Π ) is guaranteed by SafeStack(push(Φ, A,C, σ ) |Π ). Secondly, we show
SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : C} |Π ). Because SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) is guaranteed by SafeStack(push(Φ, A,C, σ ) |Π ),
it suffices to show that Π ` r : C ′ implies C ′ <: C . The implication is ensured by SafeFrame(Φ′ |Π ).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
We confirm ConfinedState(T ) by a case analysis on the transition rule employed to obtain S →Σ T .
Case T-G-WIDEN: We show ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {r : Bβ} |Π , A.m) in two steps. First, P-CT-WIDEN guarantees
that B F A. Second, by ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m), Φ ` r : Cγ and Π ` r : C ′ jointly imply that
either (i) C ′ I C or (ii) (γ 6= this ∧ m = anon). If case (i) holds, then P-CT-WIDEN ensures that
C I B∨(β 6= this∧m = anon), and thus by (2) we deduce (C ′ I B∨(γ 6= this∧m = anon)) as required.
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Otherwise, case (ii) holds. Because P-CT-WIDEN ensures that γ <: β, we deduce (β 6= this ∧ m = anon)
as required.
Case T-G-NEW: ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} |Π ∪ {r : Bβ}, A.m) holds,6 because (i) P-CT-NEW mandates that
B F A, and (ii) B I B by (1).
Case T-G-CAST: Similar to T-G-WIDEN.
Case T-G-GET: We show ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {q : Cγ } |Π , A.m) in two steps. First, P-CT-GET ensures7 that
C I B and B F A. Thus, by (5), we have C F A as required. Second, ConfinedLinks(Γ |Π ) guarantees that
Γ ` p : B ; q : C and Π ` q : C ′ jointly imply C ′ I C as required.
Case T-G-PUT: We show ConfinedLinks(Γ ∪ {p : B ; q : C} |Π ) in 2 steps. First, C I B is guaranteed by
P-CT-PUT. Second, because P-CT-PUT requires that (γ = this∨m 6= anon), ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m)
therefore implies C ′ I C as required.8
Case T-G-INVOKE: We want to demonstrate that ConfinedFrame(Φ′ |Π , B ′.n′) and ConfinedStack(σ ′ |Π , B ′.n′).
To show ConfinedFrame(Φ′ |Π , B ′.n′), where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′β0 , r : Cβ}, we treat the labelled references
r0 : B ′β0 and r : Cβ separately. We first consider r : Cβ . First, because P-CT-INVOKE mandates
βi = this, we need C ′i I Ci whenever Π ` ri : C ′i . This holds because ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m)
implies (C ′i I Ci ∨ (γi 6= this ∧ m = anon)) while P-CT-INVOKE requires (γi = this ∨ m 6= anon).
Second, we need Ci F B ′. Observe that P-CT-INVOKE guarantees Ci I B, while B I B ′ because of (6). By
(2) and (3), we deduce Ci F B ′.
We now consider the labelled reference r0 : B ′β0 . By (4), we have B ′ F B ′, and so it remains to show
that Π ` r0 : C ′0 entails (C ′0 I B ′ ∨ (β0 6= this ∧ n′ = anon)). There are two subcases: n = anon or
n 6= anon. If n = anon, then P-CT-INVOKE guarantees n′ = anon and β0 = this as required. If n 6= anon,
then P-CT-INVOKE ensures that (C0 I B ∧ (γ0 = this∨m 6= anon)). By ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m), the
second conjunct implies C ′0 I C0. By (6), we also have B I B ′. We therefore obtain C ′0 I B ′ from (2).
To show ConfinedStack(σ ′ |Π , B ′.n′), where σ ′ = push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ ), notice that the preconditions
of the theorem already guarantee ConfinedFrame(Φ |Π , A.m) and ConfinedStack(σ |Π , A.m). As well,
both (β = this ∨ n′ 6= anon) and γ = this are antecedents of P-CT-INVOKE. What remains to be shown is
C F A, which, by (5), follows from C I B and B F A, both being antecedent of P-CT-INVOKE.
Case T-G-RETURN: We show ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {r : Cγ } |Π , A.m) in two steps. First, Confined-
Stack(push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ ) |Π , B ′.n′) guarantees C F A as required. Second, because Confined-
Stack(push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ ) |Π , B ′.n′) requires γ = this, we need to show that Π ` r : C ′ implies
C ′ I C . But thenConfinedStack(push(Φ, A.m,Cβ/γ , σ ) |Π , B ′.n′) also guarantees (β = this∨n′ 6= anon),
which, by ConfinedFrame(Φ′ |Π , B ′.n′), entails C ′ I C as required.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 5
We confirm ConfinedStatecap(T ) by a case analysis on the transition rule employed to obtain S →Σ T .
Case T-G-WIDEN: We show ConfinedFramecap(Φ∪{r : Bβ} |Π , A) in two steps. First, P-CAP-WIDEN guarantees
that BβF : A ∨ β = anon. Second, by ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A), Π ` r : C ′ implies C ′∗ I: Cγ , which
in turn implies C ′∗ I: Bβ via (10) because P-CAP-WIDEN guarantees Cγ I: Bβ .
Case T-G-NEW: ConfinedFramecap(Π ∪ {r : B} |Φ ∪ {r : B∗}, A) holds, because (i) P-CAP-NEW mandates that
B∗F: A, and (ii) B∗ I: B∗ by (9).
Case T-G-CAST: Similar to T-G-WIDEN.
Case T-G-GET: We show ConfinedFramecap(Φ ∪ {q : Cγ } |Π , A) in two steps. First, P-CAP-GET ensures that
Cγ I: B∗ and B∗F : A. Thus, by (13), we have Cγ F : A as required. Second, ConfinedLinkscap(Γ |Π )
guarantees that Γ ` p : B γ; q : C and Π ` q : C ′ jointly imply C ′∗ I: Cγ as required.
6 The antecedent β = this in P-CT-NEW is not needed for establishing the Confinement Theorem. It is introduced to make the type analysis
more accurate.
7 The antecedent C I B is redundant in P-CT-GET, because the condition is already implied by ConfinedLinks(Γ |Π ). It is introduced for
symmetry.
8 The antecedent B F A in P-CT-PUT is not needed for establishing the Confinement Theorem. It is introduced for symmetry.
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Case T-G-PUT: We show ConfinedLinkscap(Γ ∪ {p : B γ; q : C} |Π ) in 2 steps. First, Cγ I: B∗ is guaranteed by
P-CAP-PUT. Second, by ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A), Π ` r : C ′ implies C ′∗ I: Cγ as required.
Case T-G-INVOKE: We show that ConfinedFramecap(Φ′ |Π , B ′) and ConfinedStackcap(σ ′ |Π ).
To show ConfinedFramecap(Φ′ |Π , B ′), where Φ′ = {r0 : B ′β ′0 , r : Cβ}, we treat the labelled references
r0 : B ′β ′0 and r : Cβ separately. We first consider r : Cβ . First, observe that ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A)
ensures that C ′i
∗ I: Cγii when Π ` ri : C ′i . Second, observe that P-CAP-INVOKE guarantees Cγii I: B∗,
which, by (6), (11), (10) and (12), implies Ci γiF: B ′ as required.
We now consider the labelled reference r0 : B ′β ′0 . First, P-CAP-INVOKE requires Cγ00 I: Bβ0 and
Bβ0 I: B ′β ′0 , which, by (10), implies Cγ00 I: B ′β
′
0 . By ConfinedFramecap(Φ |Π , A) and (10), this in turn
implies C ′0
∗ I: B ′β ′0 when Π ` r0 : C ′0. Second, the requirement (B ′β
′
0F : B ′ ∨ β ′0 = anon) is satisfied
trivially by (15).
To show ConfinedStackcap(σ ′ |Π ), where σ ′ = push(Φ, A,Cγ /γ , σ ), notice that Confined-
Framecap(Φ |Π , A) and ConfinedStackcap(σ |Π ) are already guaranteed by the preconditions. What remains
to be shown is Cγ F : A, which, by (13), follows from Cγ I: B∗ and B∗F : A, both guaranteed by P-CAP-
INVOKE.
Case T-G-RETURN: We show ConfinedFramecap(Φ ∪ {r : Cγ } |Π , A) in two steps. First, Confined-
Framecap(push(Φ, A.α,Cγ /γ , σ ) |Π , B ′) guarantees Cγ F : A as required. Second, by Confined-
Framecap(Φ′ |Π , B ′), Π ` r : C ′ implies C ′∗ I: Cγ as required.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 6
The proof parallels that of Theorem 1 closely. Only the following cases are interesting:
Case T-E-NEWARRAY: Because r is a fresh object reference from O, SafeHeap(Π ∪ {r : R[ ]}) holds trivially. As
well, SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : R[ ]} |Π ∪ {r : R[ ]γ }) holds because R[ ] <: R[ ].
Case T-E-GETARRAY: Notice that T-E-GETARRAY guarantees Γ ` p : [ ] ; q, which, by SafeLinks(Γ |Π ),
implies that Q <: P whenever Π ` p : P[ ] and Π ` q : Q. By SafeFrame(Φ |Π ), P[ ] <: R[ ], and thus
P <: R. By transitivity of subtyping, we deduce Q <: R, and thus obtain SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {q : Rβ} |Π ) as
required.
Case T-E-PUTARRAY: We have SafeLinks(Γ ∪{p : [ ]; q} |Π ) as required, because T-E-PUTARRAY guarantees
that Q <: P whenever Π ` p : P[ ] and Π ` q : Q.
Case T-E-THROW: By straightforward induction, one can show that
( SafeFrame(Φ |Π ) ∧ SafeStack(σ |Π ) ∧ unwind(Φ, A.m, σ ; Φ′, A′.m′, σ ′) )
⇒ ( SafeFrame(Φ′ |Π ) ∧ SafeStack(σ ′ |Π ) ) .
What remains to be shown is SafeFrame(Φ′ ∪ {r : Bβ} |Π ). But then that is straightforward because T-E-
THROW guarantees that C ′ <: B whenever Π ` r : C ′.
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